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The Role of International Law in U.S. Constitutional 
Interpretation: Original Meaning, Sovereignty and the 
Ninth Amendment 
Elizabeth Price Foley
1
 
The topic of this symposium—the role of international law in U.S. 
constitutional interpretation—is intensely controversial.   But make 
no mistake about it:  As with most issues of U.S. constitutional law, the 
controversy is mostly political.  Accepting this fact, the goal of this 
essay is to explore the possibility of a political middle ground that re-
cognizes a legitimate role for international law in U.S. constitutional 
interpretation (something liberals desire), but only insofar as is consis-
tent with original meaning (something conservatives desire).  I will 
then discuss briefly the specific example of the Ninth Amendment, 
exploring how this Amendment’s original meaning may have contem-
plated the application of early international law principles relating to 
sovereignty. 
I.  THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW—JUST ANOTHER CHAPTER 
IN THE ONGOING “CULTURE WAR” 
A.  How the Culture War Has Affected Law Generally 
One of the problems with U.S. constitutional law generally is that 
every major intellectual gray area has been hijacked by ideologues 
with a broader political axe to grind.  Issues as seemingly innocuous as 
abstention, standing, and the Eleventh Amendment thus have become 
battlegrounds in an ongoing culture war between the far right and far 
left.   
Zealots of the far right and far left obviously want to win the on-
going culture war, a political goal that does not necessarily require 
fidelity to a written text or its underlying delicate intellectual com-
promise, brokered by a long-dead founding generation.  And you can-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.  This article is based 
substantially on a talk presented at a symposium to dedicate the new building for the FIU Col-
lege of Law on Feb. 9, 2007.    
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not really blame them.  Why not take the easy route and try to get a 
majority of the Court to simply “reinterpret” the Constitution in a 
manner consistent with one’s preferred ideology?  It provides a much 
swifter and more satisfying victory.  But, of course, this path to easy 
constitutional victory is fraught with hazards of its own.  It imposes 
intense and sustained political attention and pressure on the Court.  It 
should come as no surprise, then, that Court nominations and opinions 
have become increasingly contentious, vitriolic and fractured.  And 
when majority opinions do somehow miraculously emerge, all too of-
ten these precedents have the half-life of a fruit fly.    
The American public is painfully aware of the political game be-
ing played with the Constitution.  A recent poll showed that eighty-
five percent of Americans think partisan backgrounds influence a 
judge’s decisions, and more than half think judges actually decide cas-
es based on personal beliefs rather than legal precedent or the Consti-
tution.2  
These events are not considered to be normatively desirable.  
Nearly three out of four Americans think judges need to be more in-
sulated from outside political pressure and make decisions based on 
their reading of the law.3  A decisive super-majority of Americans thus 
do not consider judges to be just another type of politician.  And yet, 
in the eyes of many, law and politics have become synonymous.  This, 
in turn, has undermined respect for law and the courts.4   
B.  How the Culture War Has Affected U.S. Constitutional Interpreta-
tion 
The broader culture war has spawned two main interpretive 
camps in the realm of U.S. constitutional law: (1) the so-called “living 
Constitution” adherents, who think that constitutional language 
should be viewed as fluid, open to re-interpretation according to mod-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Press Release, Syracuse Univ., Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship and Pub. Affairs, Maxwell 
Poll:  Partisan Politics Colors Americans’ View of U.S. Courts, (Oct. 19, 2005), at 1, available at 
http://sunews.syr.edu/story_details.cfm?id=2632.  For the full text of the poll results, see Judges 
and the American Public’s View of Them, Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship and Pub. Affairs, Syracuse 
Univ. (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/MaxwellPoll.pdf. 
 3 Judges and the American Public’s View of Them, Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship and Pub. 
Affairs, Syracuse Univ. (Oct. 2005), available at 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/MaxwellPoll.pdf. 
 4 See ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LIBERTY FOR ALL: RECLAIMING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
IN A NEW ERA OF PUBLIC MORALITY 5, 201 n.14 (2006) (discussing results of a 2005 poll by the 
American Bar Association, which indicated widespread public dissatisfaction with the judicial 
branch). 
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ern preferences and norms;5 and (2) the so-called “originalists,” who 
think that constitutional language should be viewed as fixed, revealing 
a set of first principles that must be honored regardless of modern 
exigencies or preferences.6     
The living Constitution shibboleth has great rhetorical appeal be-
cause it suggests that those who disagree with it must necessarily sup-
port a dead Constitution.  After all, who wouldn’t prefer a living Con-
stitution to a dead one?  Rhetoric aside, however, it requires one to 
accept that the Constitution rests on a foundation of sand.  Modern 
adherents of the living Constitution theory7 argue unabashedly that 
there are no fixed principles that should guide constitutional interpre-
tation.8  Everything of importance is open to reinterpretation accord-
ing to the preferences of the day.  Judges are required to take impor-
tant phrases in the text—such as Commerce, Privileges or Immunities, 
Due Process, or Equal Protection—and assume that there are no un-
derlying principles that can or should be ascertained in interpreting 
their meaning.  Because no underlying principles can be ascertained, 
judges should feel free to ascribe whatever meaning they think is ap-
propriate for the times.  This is, of course, subjectivism run amok.  It 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See generally Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 673 (1963).  For a critique of the living Constitution approach, see William H. Rehnquist, 
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976), reprinted in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 401 (2006).  See also Edwin Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from 
Judicial Law-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925 (1996). 
 6 See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).  
For an insightful critique of Justice Scalia’s self-professed version of originalism, see Randy E. 
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of ‘Faint-Hearted’ Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006).  
For a critique of originalism generally, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Un-
derstanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
 7 I intentionally say “modern” living Constitution adherents here, to distinguish them 
from those of the founding generation, such as Thomas Jefferson, who appears to have accepted 
a different version of the living Constitution idea.  To Jefferson, constitutional principles could 
not be discarded when inconvenient or unfashionable.  These principles were articulated in 
sufficiently broad and amorphous language as to permit the principles to adapt to modern times.  
In his words, “Time indeed changes manners and notions, and so far we must expect institutions 
to bend to them.  But time produces also corruption of principles, and against this it is the duty of 
good citizens to be every on the watch, and if the gangrene is to prevail at last, let the day be 
kept off as long as possible.”  LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at xi.  Jefferson also declared, 
“Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution.  Let us not make it a blank 
paper by construction.”  Id. at 1 (letter from Jefferson to Wilson Nicholas, 1803). 
 8 Perhaps one of the boldest proponents of the “living Constitution” theory is Professor 
Bruce Ackerman, who asserts that changed understandings and desires from one generation to 
the next can result in legitimate constitutional “amendment” in a way that does not require 
resort to the amendment processes specified in Article V.  See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).  For a critique of Ackerman’s attempt to legitimate the New 
Deal Court’s “reinterpretation” of the Commerce Clause, see Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional 
Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 
157-67 (1998). 
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makes constitutional law synonymous with politics in its rawest, ugli-
est form. 
The living Constitution approach has the benefit of allowing the 
Constitution to morph into whatever seems expedient or desirable at 
any given moment.  But it creates three distinct social harms.  First, it 
allows the judiciary to discard fundamental, structural features of 
Constitution that were designed to protect individual liberty (e.g., fe-
deralism and limited government).  Second, it undermines respect for 
the Constitution itself as a meaningful set of principles divorced from 
political ideology.  I have found this problem to be especially acute 
with young lawyers.  Many young law students come into constitution-
al law as bright-eyed and bushy-tailed idealists, only to leave with a 
cynical view that the Court’s disregard of text and its historical con-
text has transformed the Constitution into a politically manipulable 
document with very little or no real fixed meaning.  To me, this is a 
real and substantial societal loss.  Third, the living Constitution theory 
encourages political lethargy.  It does so because it not only allows but 
expects the judiciary to fix modern problems by simply doing an in-
terpretive about-face.  If the Constitution is malleable enough to 
change with the times (without a formal amendment), there is ob-
viously no need for We the People to get involved: the Court will fix 
the problem and we can all get on with our busy lives—taking our 
kids to soccer, eating our chicken nuggets, and paying our bills.   
In this world of politically expedient constitutional reinterpreta-
tion, ordinary Americans are missing in action, cut out of any political 
dialogue that precedes constitutional change.  We have effectively giv-
en our proxy to the political extremists, who wield it on our behalf by 
convincing our Supreme Court that constitutional change does not 
require our formal involvement, Article V notwithstanding.  The re-
sulting political lethargy—which is, by the way, even greater among 
minority groups9—is dangerous to the proper functioning of our re-
publican form of government.   
So if the living Constitution theory is as bad as I claim it is, what 
makes originalism any better?  First, I confess that I find the original-
ism label to be a bit misleading.  Contrary to most Americans’ under-
standing—including law students and law professors—there are sev-
eral different kinds of originalism, and they present markedly differ-
ent approaches to constitutional interpretation.10  In either case, how-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 202 n.18. 
 10 For a general discussion about the various shades of original intent originalism, see 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92-
94 (2004); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1085, 1085-87 (1989) (describing various versions of original intent originalism). 
2007] The Role of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation 31 
ever, the originalists share the belief that constitutional text matters, 
and that the text can and should be interpreted by reference to the 
principles, political philosophy and events that motivated the proposal 
and ratification of the text.   
One of the biggest problems originalism faces is that its votaries 
too often pretend that there is an answer to most or all questions of 
constitutional interpretation that can be answered by simply polling 
the Founders or their generation on any given issue.  This is proble-
matic because, in most instances, the issues presented for judicial reso-
lution are issues that were either not foreseen by the founding genera-
tion (e.g., the Internet and its relationship to the First Amendment) or, 
if they were foreseen, were not specifically debated and resolved in 
any definitive way.   
One need look no further than the modern Supreme Court’s fun-
damental rights jurisprudence to see this problematic aspect of origi-
nalism rear its ugly head.  To qualify as a fundamental right, modern 
substantive due process jurisprudence generally requires that the ac-
tivity in question be one that is “deeply rooted in our nation’s history 
and tradition.”11  It then attempts to answer the “deeply rooted” in-
quiry by looking back to see whether early common or statutory law 
allowed or condemned the activity in question.  An historical prohibi-
tion of X, therefore, will equal no fundamental right to do X.12   
                                                                                                                           
 11 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).  The Court reasoned: 
 
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary fea-
tures: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially pro-
tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition.’  Second, we have required in substantive-due-
process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.  Our 
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial ‘guideposts 
for responsible decisionmaking,’ that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due 
Process Clause. 
 
Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted). 
 12 This was evident in the majority opinion in Glucksberg, in which the Court rejected the 
assertion that individuals have a substantive liberty to receive the aid of a physician in commit-
ting suicide.  See id. at 723.  The Court explained: 
 
[W]e are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long 
rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for termi-
nally ill, mentally competent adults.  To hold for respondents, we would have to re-
verse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy 
choice of almost every State.  
 
Id.  The Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas did not employ this typical “deeply 
rooted” analysis in striking down the Texas anti-sodomy law on substantive due process grounds, 
but this is apparently because the majority in Lawrence did not find the right of intimate associa-
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The requirement that fundamental rights have a deep history of 
acknowledgement and acceptance has been driven and defended 
principally by self-confessed originalists on the Court.13  They opine 
that this substantive limitation on the recognition of fundamental 
rights is necessary to prevent the judiciary from substituting its subjec-
                                                                                                                           
tion to be “fundamental.”  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia argued: 
 
Though there is discussion of “fundamental propositions,” and “fundamental deci-
sions,” nowhere does the Court's [majority] opinion declare that homosexual sodo-
my is a ‘fundamental right.’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the 
Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if 
homosexual sodomy were a “fundamental right.”  Thus, while overruling the out-
come of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely untouched its central legal conclusion: 
“Respondent would have us announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy.  This we are quite unwilling to do.”  Instead the Court simply de-
scribes petitioners' conduct as “an exercise of their liberty”—which it undoubtedly 
is—and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have 
far-reaching implications beyond this case. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Justice Scalia added: 
The Court today does not overrule this holding.  Not once does it describe homosex-
ual sodomy as a “fundamental right” or a “fundamental liberty interest,” nor does it 
subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny.  Instead, having failed to establish that the 
right to homosexual sodomy is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,’” the Court concludes that the application of Texas's statute to petitioners' con-
duct fails the rational-basis test, and overrules Bowers' holding to the contrary.  ‘The 
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into 
the personal and private life of the individual.’”  
 
Id. at 594 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 13 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952-53 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the characterization of abor-
tion as a ‘fundamental’ right because of its historical prohibition); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 593 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (sharply criticizing the Lawrence majority’s failure to employ the “deeply 
rooted” inquiry).  In Bowers, the Supreme Court stated: 
 
It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental 
right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against 
that conduct have ancient roots.  Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and 
was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of 
Rights.  In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 
States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws.  In fact, until 1961, all 50 States out-
lawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide 
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.  
Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” is, at best, facetious . . . .   
 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) (internal citations omitted).  The Bowers de-
cision was explicitly overruled in Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), but as I explain the previous 
footnote, the Lawrence majority did not apply (much less overrule) the “deeply rooted” funda-
mental rights analysis, suggesting that the right to intimate association recognized in Lawrence is 
not considered to be a fundamental right. 
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tive countermajoritarian preferences for those of the more politically 
accountable branches of government.14  Yet this approach is breathta-
kingly non-originalist.   
First, notice what is going on here, as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation: We are presumptively limiting fundamental rights sta-
tus to those activities that were explicitly allowed by early common 
and statutory law.  And of course, a right that is not a “fundamental” 
right is really no right at all, since it will be subject to rationality re-
view, which requires the Court to uphold any restriction on the exer-
cise of the non-fundamental right so long as the restriction serves 
some arguably rational purpose.15 
Employing early common and statutory law as a litmus test for 
the presumption for or against fundamental rights status puts the pro-
verbial cart before the constitutional horse.  If X was prohibited by 
common or statutory law in the early days, the argument goes, we 
must assume that the founding generation—unless they specifically 
singled out X as a constitutional right in the text—must have wanted 
to allow the prohibition of X to continue.  Laws against suicide and 
assisted suicide, for example, have been on the books since the early 
days of the republic, as have laws against sodomy.  These activities, 
therefore, cannot qualify as fundamental rights.16 
This supposedly originalist analytical framework is patently ridi-
culous, since the Constitution was written in the broad language of 
principles; it does not overrule common law or invalidate statutes by 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.  In Glucksberg, the Court explained: 
 
[W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process 
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are 
scarce and open-ended.  By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right 
or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public 
debate and legislative action.  We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever 
we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of 
this Court. 
 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 15 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a funda-
mental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it 
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”). 
 16 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-15, 728 (cataloguing the historical prohibition against 
suicide and assistance with suicide and concluding that this history required a finding that physi-
cian-assisted suicide was not a fundamental right); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (cataloguing the 
historical prohibitions against sodomy); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-70 (reconsidering the nature 
of the historical prohibitions against sodomy).  See also supra note 13 (exploring how the majori-
ty of the Court in Lawrence v. Texas did not appear base their holding on fundamental rights 
analysis). 
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name.  We would be well advised to recall Chief Justice Marshall’s 
sage observation about constitutional interpretation: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the sub-
divisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the 
means by which they may be carried into execution,  would 
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely 
be embraced by the  human mind.  It would probably nev-
er be understood by the public.  Its nature,  therefore, re-
quires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its im-
portant objects designated, and the minor ingredients which 
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the 
objects themselves.  That this idea was entertained by the 
framers of the American constitution, is not only to be in-
ferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the lan-
guage. . . .  [W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution 
we are expounding.17 
Along these lines, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause did not mention the existing Jim Crow laws by name or even 
segregation of public schools, but its underlying principle was undoub-
tedly antithetical to these laws.18  So when it comes to broad language 
elsewhere in the constitutional text such as the word “liberty” in the 
Due Process Clauses, why would a so-called originalist conclude that 
the text endorses the validity of common or statutory prohibitions in 
existence at the time of the text’s ratification?  The answer, of course, 
is that we should not.  Our interpretive task, properly understood, 
should be to ascertain the principles that animate the constitutional 
text—in this case, the Due Process Clauses—and then compare these 
principles against specific laws to determine constitutional compatibil-
ity.19   
                                                                                                                           
 17 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
 18 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in public 
schools to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause).  See also Michael W. McConnell, Origi-
nalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1093 (1995) (“[I]t is clear beyond 
peradventure that a very substantial portion of the Congress [from 1871-1875], including leading 
framers of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, subscribed to the view that school segregation violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  At a minimum, therefore, the scholarly consensus must be cor-
rected to admit that this interpretation is within the legitimate range of interpretation on origi-
nalist grounds.”). 
 19 If one studies the history of the Due Process Clauses, it becomes clear that they em-
braced the concept of procedural fairness, much the same as the “law of the land” clause of the 
Magna Carta.  In this sense, the very concept of “substantive” due “process” is oxymoronic, both 
as a textual and contextual matter.  This is not to say, however, that there is no textual basis in the 
Constitution for the recognition of unenumerated rights.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Ninth Amendment provide adequate textual and contex-
tual support. 
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Self-professed originalists’ use of the “deeply rooted” litmus test 
for fundamental rights is even more perverse when one considers that 
the old common and statutory law prohibitions that are being ele-
vated to near-constitutional status are often laws that the original co-
lonies inherited from Great Britain, which had a very different con-
ception of government than our newly minted Constitution.  In Brit-
ain, for example, the legislative branch (Parliament) had plenary pow-
er; it was a Leviathan that even possessed the power to define and 
redefine the unwritten British Constitution.  The British vision of par-
liamentary supremacy was a reflection of the fact that the British 
people trusted their Parliament more than they trusted their monarch 
or the monarch’s courts.  In the newly independent States, as well as 
the U.S., the people trusted none of their elected governors, preferring 
to subject all branches of the government, including the legislature, to 
a series of elaborate checks and balances to keep them within their 
proper bounds.   
My point is this: Why give any interpretive relevance at all to 
common and statutory law that existed at the time of the ratification 
of the relevant constitutional language?  Yes, many of these common 
law doctrines and statutes are hundreds of years old.  But does this 
make them presumptively constitutional?  Surely not, for one impor-
tant reason:  Their ancient ancestry, rather than granting an imprima-
tur of constitutional acceptability, should make them inherently sus-
pect, as they are byproducts of a system of government that embraced 
plenary legislative power—a norm that Americans clearly rejected.  
Colonial legislatures were mini-Parliaments, inheritors of the British 
acceptance of legislative supremacy.  They passed many laws, and 
these laws were considered presumptively unassailable under then-
existing visions of legislative supremacy.   
After the Constitution was ratified, moreover, these colonial and 
early state laws generally could not be ruled unconstitutional because 
the early Supreme Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, declared that the Bill 
of Rights was not binding upon the States.20  Indeed, because the Su-
preme Court did not begin the process of “selective” incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights until the early- to mid-twentieth century, there was 
no legal basis for claiming that longstanding state laws violated the 
Constitution.  In a perverse sense, therefore, the Supreme Court’s de-
lay in recognizing a constitutional source for the protection of un-
enumerated rights caused these early laws to become “deeply rooted.” 
                                                                                                                           
 20 32 U.S. 243 (1833).  For greater elaboration on the analytical defects of Barron, see 
LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 27-33. 
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Yet self-professed originalists on the Court today see no apparent 
problem with freezing this early statutory/common law into place and 
allowing it to drive our definition of fundamental rights.  This so-called 
originalist approach is at odds with both the broadly worded text of 
the Constitution as well as the deeper principles animating the text, 
both of which support a more generous conceptualization of individu-
al rights. 
I feel free to say all of these bad things about both living constitu-
tionalists as well as the originalists because I do not consider myself to 
have a horse in this political race, so to speak.  I feel no emotional or 
intellectual attachment to either liberal or conservative ideologies, and 
I would simply like, as an ordinary American with some specialized 
knowledge on constitutional law, to work towards an interpretive ap-
proach without regard to the political desirability of the outcomes that 
may flow there from.   
My own biases in constitutional interpretation, however, do exist, 
and I think it is important to reveal them up front.  First, I do consider 
myself to be an originalist, though as you can see by the preceding 
discussion of modern substantive due process jurisprudence, I have 
many quarrels with the apparently outcome-oriented tactics of many 
self-confessed originalists.  But I do start from the position that text 
matters.  I do not think judges are free to discard the text when it 
proves inconvenient or uncomfortable.  Any perceived pragmatic 
problems posed by the constitutional text should be overcome only by 
the amendment processes specified in Article V.21  So if the constitu-
tional text explicitly gives Congress a power to regulate bananas, it 
would be illegitimate for the judiciary to interpret this as also giving 
Congress a power to regulate oranges.  And it would certainly be ille-
gitimate to interpret it more broadly as a power to regulate all fruit or 
food products more generally.  But it’s precisely this “latitude of con-
struction”—as several prominent framers called it22—that has become 
an accepted modus operandi in constitutional interpretation. 
                                                                                                                           
 21 U.S. CONST. art. IV (requiring that proposed constitutional amendments be approved by 
two-thirds of both houses of Congress and ratified by three-quarters of the States). 
 22 The first real debate about accepting a latitude of constitutional construction occurred 
in the context of considering the constitutionality of the first national bank.  Several prominent 
framers, most notably Madison and Jefferson, argued against a latitude of construction of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause so broad as to grant Congress a power to create the national bank.  
See James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, in 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 
1949 (1791); see also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank 
(1791), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 115, 117 (Mel-
vin I. Urofsky & Paul Finkelman eds., 2002).  
Of course it is clear that Hamilton’s latitudinarian approach to interpreting the Necessary 
and Proper Clause ultimately prevailed (not Madison’s or Jefferson’s).  See McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  But this does not alter the conclusion that an interpretation of constitu-
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Second, I believe that interpreting constitutional text requires 
understanding and honoring the historical context and political phi-
losophy that animated the writing of the words.  What identified prob-
lems were the words designed to solve?  What did ordinary Americans 
think the words were accomplishing?  In this sense, I would align my-
self most closely with original meaning originalists.  But regardless of 
the specific originalist label one wishes to attach, my basic approach 
clearly rejects the living Constitution theory. 
Yet acknowledging that constitutional interpretation requires a 
judge to ascertain the principles animating an often-amorphous text 
does not mean that a judge should try to divine the subjective though-
ts or beliefs of the founders.  Indeed, it does not even require the 
judge to ascertain what a majority of founders thought on the issue (if 
indeed they thought about it at all). 
Instead, it means that judges should try to understand the prob-
lems with antecedent forms of government that the founding genera-
tions were trying to solve, as well as their general political philosophy 
about the nature of government itself—its purposes and its limits.  
These generic principles can then provide the appropriate philosophi-
cal backdrop for ascribing meaning to an otherwise ambiguous text.  
It is this type of originalism which I think most Americans can 
embrace.  It does not freeze statutory, common, or even constitutional 
law into place, but recognizes that a judge’s job in interpreting the 
Constitution is to honor the original vision of government—the rela-
tionship between the people and their elected governors—that is em-
bodied in the text and the principles that animated that text.  This in-
terpretive approach allows the Constitution’s broad words to be in-
terpreted to cover new technologies and events never dreamed of by 
the founding generation, but only so long as the principles themselves 
are not discarded when they prove politically or pragmatically incon-
venient.  In this narrower sense, the Constitution is a living document, 
not because its text can be ignored or reinterpreted to fit modern po-
litical preferences, but because the text itself and its underlying prin-
ciples are generally broad enough to accommodate modern applica-
tions.  
In order to work, however, this interpretive method necessarily 
requires that succeeding generations of Americans (most particularly 
lawyers) be educated in the founding generations’ political philoso-
phy—something which simply does not happen today, even in law 
                                                                                                                           
tional text that is inconsistent with its historical context is illegitimate.  One need look no further 
than the New Deal Court’s “reinterpretation” of the commerce power to see another, more 
recent example of such illegitimate latitudinarian interpretation.  See Price, supra note 8, at 157-
67. 
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schools.   Indeed, in most law schools, constitutional law has been con-
densed into a single-semester, four credit-hour course, leaving profes-
sors with barely enough time to teach the main constitutional cases, 
much less a meaningful exegesis of the political philosophy of the re-
levant founding generations and the problems they were trying to 
solve.  All the average law student gets to see, therefore, is a bunch of 
constitutional law cases that (not surprisingly) appear to be products 
of the politics of their day.  
This is a deep shame, since the original Constitution and subse-
quent amendments have often been motivated by a desire to solve 
specific perceived problems, and they are often the product of a 
shared political philosophy that can provide important first principles 
to aid constitutional interpretation.  Without a significant grounding in 
the founding generations’ political philosophy, students simply cannot 
see how far these cases have drifted from original understandings.  
Students come to learn, in other words, that constitutional law is just 
politics—and they assume that there is really nothing that can be 
done to remedy this, even though they almost uniformly seem to think 
this approach is normatively undesirable. 
II.  THE DEBATE ABOUT THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
What does all of the preceding mean for the debate about the 
role international law should play in interpreting the U.S. Constitu-
tion?  It means that the two interpretive approaches being passionate-
ly espoused are equally unattractive.  The living constitutionalists 
think that the U.S. should take into account international law when 
interpreting the Constitution.23  Originalists, on the other hand, argue 
that judges generally should not rely on international law as an aid to 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.24   
                                                                                                                           
 23 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Humankind”: The 
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 1 FIU L. REV. 27, 36 (2006).  
As Justice Ginsburg explained her view: 
 
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States in 
grappling with hard questions, I earlier suggested, has a close kinship to the view of 
the U.S. Constitution as a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its ra-
tification.  I am not a partisan of that view.  U.S. jurists honor the Framers' intent “to 
create a more perfect Union,” I believe, if they read the Constitution as belonging to 
a global 21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century understandings. 
 
Id. at 36.  
 24 Seventh Circuit judge Frank Easterbrook puts it this way: 
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Is it possible that there is a middle ground, one that would recog-
nize a legitimate role for the use of international law that is consistent 
with the founding generations’ understanding of the government they 
established?  I think the answer is yes.  To the extent that the text or 
historical context animating portions of the U.S. Constitution reflect 
an acceptance of international law principles, an originalist should 
consult these international law principles.  These international law 
principles would be not only salient to the originalist’s interpretive 
quest, but indeed indispensable to it.   
A.  Which International Law Is Relevant? 
A more contentious issue involves precisely which international 
law principles matter: modern ones, or ones that existed at the time of 
the founding?  As an originalist, the answer must necessarily be the 
international law principles that existed, were known and animated 
U.S. constitutional text at the time the relevant text was ratified.  This 
approach would thus exclude modern international law and all its spe-
cifics.25  If one embraces the notion of fidelity to constitutional text, 
this is a normatively desirable outcome.  After all, international law 
has come a very long way from the original Law of Nations well 
known to the founding generation and written about by philosophers 
                                                                                                                           
There are two ways to commit the United States to international norms.  The first is 
the Treaty Clause: the President plus two-thirds of the Senate may bind courts and 
citizens of the United States to a  proposition on which they agree with other na-
tions.  The second is the Law of Nations Clause, which says  that Congress may ‘de-
fine and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations’.  This requires a majority in each chamber plus the Pres-
ident, or two-thirds in  each chamber to override a veto.  
 
There is no corresponding power in the judiciary to make any norm of international 
law binding within the United States. . . .  [T]he judiciary [cannot] insist that the gov-
ernment itself is bound by norms from outside our borders, and which our elected 
representatives have not adopted and are not allowed to change. 
 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and the American Constitution, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 223 (2006).  See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack. L. Goldsmith, Customary International 
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) 
(arguing against acceptance of customary international law as binding federal law); Roger P. 
Alford, The United States Constitution and International Law: Misusing International Sources to 
Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004) (offering a comprehensive criticism of the 
use of international law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, 
Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007) (discussing the 
“democratic deficit” that results when U.S. courts rely on international law). 
 25 But cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death 
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085 (2002) (arguing for the use of modern international law 
principles to compel the determination that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment).  
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such as Grotius,26 Pufendorf,27 Burlamaqui,28 and Vattel.29  It is these 
early international law principles—not the modern international law 
offshoots that subsequently have developed—that originalists can and 
should consult in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. 
Living constitutionalists will not like this because it does not 
achieve the desired goal of incorporating modern international law 
into the U.S. Constitution.  And given the political nature of constitu-
tional discourse these days, many originalists will not like this either, 
since it would require them to consult and sometimes be bound by 
international law principles, allowing the camel’s nose to enter the 
interpretive tent. 
Extreme positions aside, however, what would it mean if early in-
ternational law principles were deemed to be a legitimate source of 
interpretive material for the U.S. Constitution?  The full explication is 
well beyond this short essay and would likely take many years to play 
out jurisprudentially.  But I will offer one example involving the Ninth 
Amendment that I have discovered in my own research and which I 
explore in more detail in my recent book.30    
B.  The Ninth Amendment and the Early Law of Nations 
The early international law—the Law of Nations—that was in 
place at the time of the founding, offered a very rich and well-
developed conception of sovereignty.  To label someone as “sove-
reign” under the Law of Nations meant that that the person(s) in 
whom sovereignty lodged was all-powerful.31  After all, sovereignty 
was term borrowed from Biblical reference to God, the original sove-
reign.32  More specifically, to be sovereign under the Law of Nations 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) 
(1625). 
 27 See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF 
NATURAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758). 
 28 See, e.g., J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (Thomas Nugent trans., 
2003) (1748). 
 29 See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 
(C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather eds. & trans., 1934) (1688).  
 30 See LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 41-64. 
 31 See id. at 219 n.2 (citing numerous early Law of Nations sources defining the nature of 
sovereignty). 
 32 See JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH 46 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992) (1576).  Bodin argued: 
 
Since there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than sovereign princes, and since 
they have been established by Him as His lieutenants for commanding other men, 
we need be precise about their status so that we may respect and revere their majes-
ty in complete obedience, and do them honor in our thoughts and our speech.  Con-
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was to be legally autonomous, answerable to none.33  And all sove-
reigns were considered to be equal under the Law of Nations, and 
hence entitled to equal respect in the international community (i.e., by 
other sovereigns).34  
Under the Law of Nations, moreover, there was only one per-
ceived limit to sovereign power.  Because all sovereigns were equal, 
they were not permitted to harm other sovereigns, except in self-
defense.35  Violation of this non-aggression principle was a violation of 
the Law of Nations—and indeed, it is easy to see how this rudimenta-
ry harm principle is the seed from which the whole body of modern 
international law has sprouted.  
So what does this one example of early international law prin-
ciples mean for U.S. constitutional interpretation?  Its potential relev-
ance is as follows.  If the U.S. is a government of limited powers (as it 
was undoubtedly meant to be),36 this suggests that We the People, in 
forming our social compact (i.e., the Constitution) were the original 
source of sovereign power—a conclusion long accepted by the Su-
preme Court.37  More specifically, whatever powers the people did not 
give to the newly formed U.S. government, we either gave to our state 
governments, or kept to ourselves.  This is clearly the message of the 
Tenth Amendment.38  So by enumerating certain individual 
rights—e.g., in the first nine amendments—the citizenry carved out 
specific areas where our new, elected governors had “no power” over 
                                                                                                                           
tempt for one’s sovereign prince is contempt toward God, of whom he is the earthly 
image. 
 
Id.  
 33 See GROTIUS, supra note 26, at 62 (defining a sovereign as a person “whose actions are 
not subject to the controul [sic] of any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any 
other human will.”); PUFENDORF, supra note 29, at 1055 (saying of sovereignty that “no greater 
liberty, setting aside the sovereignty of God, can be understood as belonging to individual men, 
than the ability to dispose of their actions, strength, and faculties at their own judgment . . . .  ‘To 
do with impunity what one fancies is to be a king.’”); BODIN, supra note 32, at 4 (“For he is abso-
lutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God, that is greater than himself. . . .  [A] sove-
reign prince [ ] is answerable only to God.”). 
 34 See, e.g., BURLAMAQUI, supra note 28, at 196 (“[L]et us observe that the natural state of 
[sovereign] nations in respect to each other, is that of society and peace.  This society is likewise a 
state of equality and independence, which establishes a parity of right between them; and engag-
es them to have the same regard and respect for one another.”). 
 35 See LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 220 n.3 (citing numerous sources). 
 36 See Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1874) (“The theory of our governments, State 
and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.  The executive, the legisla-
tive, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers.”).   
 37 See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308 (1795) (“The Constitution is the 
work or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity.”). 
 38 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
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us.  These rights are, in other words, areas in which We the People have 
retained our original sovereignty: sovereignty to speak, worship God 
as we see fit, bear arms, and even be kings and queens of our own cas-
tles by having freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, etc. 
After specifying all of the areas of retained sovereignty that we 
could foresee were important, We the People then stated, in the Ninth 
Amendment, that the enumeration of these specific rights – by defin-
ing areas of no legitimate governmental power—“shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the People.”39 
The Ninth Amendment is thus a statement of what I have called 
“residual individual sovereignty.”40  It says that just because the Con-
stitution enumerates some specific areas of individual sovereignty (i.e., 
rights), those enumerations are not to be construed to mean that there 
are no other rights deserving of constitutional protection.  This basic 
conception of the meaning of the Ninth Amendment is quite consis-
tent with the context in which the Bill of Rights was ratified.  After all, 
the great fear articulated by the Federalists was that a Bill of Rights 
would be “dangerous” because enumerating some rights would neces-
sarily imply that the existence of greater governmental power to re-
strict individual liberty than originally granted.41  Relatedly, the Anti-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 40 LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 13-15.  I should, however, acknowledge the strong 
influence here of Joseph Story, who used the phrase “residuary sovereignty.”  3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1833).  Justice Story 
wrote: 
 
Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, that 
what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities, if invested by 
their constitutions of government respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is re-
tained BY THE PEOPLE, as part of their residuary sovereignty. 
 
Id. (capitals in original). 
 41 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).  Hamilton explained: 
 
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they 
are contended fork, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but 
would even be dangerous.  They would contain various exceptions to powers which 
are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim 
more than were granted.  For why declare that things shall not be done which there 
is no power to do? 
 
Id.  See also Speech of James Wilson before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 
1787), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 454.  Wilson argued against an express bill of 
rights: 
 
In a government possessed of enumerated powers, such a [bill of rights] would be 
not only unnecessary, but preposterous and dangerous. . . .  If we attempt an enume-
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Federalists insisted on a Bill of Rights precisely because they feared 
that the enumerated powers would be interpreted too broadly, there-
by encroaching upon individual liberty.42  Both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists, in other words, were ardent in their insistence that go-
vernmental powers not be so broadly interpreted as to invade the 
realm of sovereignty retained by the people. 
Madison’s careful attempt to prevent this widespread fear from 
becoming a reality was embodied in the Ninth Amendment.  In his 
words: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it 
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that 
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those 
rights which were not  singled out, were intended to be as-
signed into the hands of the General Government, and were 
consequently insecure.  This is one of the most plausible ar-
guments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a 
                                                                                                                           
ration [of rights], every thing that is not enumerated is presumed given.  The conse-
quence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the 
scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. 
 
Id. 
 42 See Speech of John Smilie before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 
1787), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 456.  Smilie argued that only a bill of rights could 
stave off tyranny: 
 
So loosely, so inaccurately are the powers which are enumerated in this constitution 
defined, that it will be impossible, without a [bill of rights], to ascertain the limits of 
authority, and to declare when government has degenerated into oppression.  In that 
event the contest will arise between the people and the rulers: “You have exceeded 
the powers of your office, you have oppressed us,’ will be the language of the suffer-
ing citizen.  The answer of the government will be short—“We have not exceeded 
our power; you have no test by which you can prove it.”  Hence, sir, it will be imprac-
ticable to stop the progress of tyranny.   
 
See also Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Oct. 5, 1787), in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 448.  Lee concurred in this: 
 
The corrupting nature of power, and its insatiable appetite for increase, hath proved 
the necessity, and procured the adoption of the strongest and most express declara-
tions of f that Residuum of natural rights, which is not intended to be given up to So-
ciety; and which indeed is not necessary to be given up for any good social purpose.  
In a government therefore, when the power of judging what shall be for the general 
welfare, which goes to the every object of human legislation; and where the laws of 
such Judges shall be the supreme Law of the Land: it seems to be of the last conse-
quence to declare in most explicit terms the reservations above alluded to.  
 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
44 FIU Law Review [3:27 
bill of right into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be 
guarded against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see 
by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution [the 
original Ninth Amendment].43 
If the Ninth Amendment is a statement that individuals have cer-
tain additional rights other than the ones specifically enumerated 
elsewhere in the Constitution, then it is fair to say that the Ninth 
Amendment is a place-marker for the concept of residual rights—i.e., 
residual individual sovereignty.  This is an apt label because individual 
rights, by definition, are conceptually the flip side of governmental 
powers.  Rights, in other words, are those areas where government has 
no power over us, where we, as individuals, retain the power to follow 
our own conscience and preferences.  If Bill has a right to do X, this is 
conceptually no different, under the American conception of negative 
rights, than saying that the government has no power to interfere with 
Bill when he engages in X.   If the government has no power over Bill 
when he engages in X, then ipso facto the power over X resides with 
Bill.  Bill’s right to do X is thus an example of Bill’s residual individual 
sovereignty—a power he retains, as an individual, to do X if he wishes. 
Some areas of individual sovereignty are of course enumerated 
specifically in the text of the Constitution, such as the rights to speech, 
assembly, bearing of arms, and so forth.  Other areas of individual so-
vereignty, however, were textually acknowledged to exist by the Ninth 
Amendment, though the impossibility of their complete enumeration 
was obvious.44    Whether specifically enumerated or not, the Constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 43 The last clause of Madison’s fourth proposal (the original version of the Ninth Amend-
ment) read: 
 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular 
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights re-
tained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but 
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution. 
 
James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in DOUGLAS KMIEC 
ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES AND PHILOSOPHY 123 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 44 Cf. Speech by James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), 
in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 454.  Wilson contended: 
There are two kinds of government—that where general power is intended to be 
given to the legislature, and that where the powers are particularly enumerated. . . . 
[W]hen general legislative powers are given, then the people part with their au-
thority, and, on the gentleman’s principle of government, retain nothing.  But in a 
government like the proposed one, ther ecna be no necessity for a bill of rights, for, 
on my principle, the people never part with their power.  Enumerate all the rights 
of men!  I am sure, sir, that no gentlmen in the late Convention would have at-
tempted such a thing. 
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tion thus accepts that individuals retained a great realm of sovereignty 
even after they ceded certain specific powers to their governors.   The 
social compact entered into grants only certain powers to our gover-
nors, and We the People, both collectively and individually, retain the 
great residuum of power. 
The Ninth Amendment is thus a critical textual statement about 
the limitations on governmental power, and concomitantly, the expan-
siveness of residual individual sovereignty.   It is an express instruction 
to the other branches of government—most notably the judiciary—
not to construe the existence of specifically enumerated rights to 
mean that there are no others worthy of constitutional status and 
hence, judicial protection.  Sadly, this rather clear textual message has 
been consistently ignored.  In Robert Bork’s famous Senate confirma-
tion hearings, he characterized the Ninth Amendment as an undeci-
pherable “inkblot”—an interpretation that has been routinely em-
braced.45 
Rights not specifically enumerated within the constitutional text 
have indeed been denied or disparaged.  They have been formally 
classified as second-class rights—a red-headed cousin, if you will, of 
the judicially favored enumerated rights.  And perhaps most ironic of 
all, the jurisprudential presumption against recognition of unenume-
rated rights is embraced by self-identified originalists such as Bork.   
One of the originalists’ primary excuses for this bizarre interpre-
tive behavior is that there are no discernible standards for ascertain-
                                                                                                                           
Id. 
 45 Judge Bork stated in the Senate confirmation hearings: 
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of 
what it means.  For example, if you had an amendment that says, “Congress shall 
make no” and then there is an inkblot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and that 
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be un-
der the inkblot.   
Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1988) 
(quoting Testimony of Robert Bork, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22, col. 1).   See also John Hart 
Ely, The Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 179 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).  Professor Ely re-
marks: 
Occasionally a commentator will express a willingness to read [the Ninth Amend-
ment] for what it seems to say, but this has been, and remains, a distinctly minority 
impulse.  In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a sure-
fire way to get a laugh (“what are you planning to rely on to support that argu-
ment, Lester, the Ninth Amendment? 
Id.  Recent constitutional scholarship, however, increasingly challenges the orthodox inkblot 
view.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 234-52 (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 
(2007); Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987). 
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ing the existence of unenumerated residual rights.46  But this is where 
understanding the original Law of Nations could help.  It suggests a 
framework for giving meaning to the Ninth Amendment—for remov-
ing the proverbial inkblot—that is based upon originalist principles.   
If the Ninth Amendment is a statement about residual individual 
sovereignty, then it requires that judges interpreting it understand 
what sovereignty meant to the founding generation.  The early inter-
national law texts provide this meaning rather clearly.  As elaborated 
earlier, under the Law of Nations as it existed at the founding, saying 
that someone had sovereignty meant that they could do as they 
pleased, so long as they did not harm other sovereigns (except in self-
defense).  If the Ninth Amendment is a place-marker for the concept 
of residual individual sovereignty, then it means that individuals have 
other areas of sovereignty, not specifically enumerated, that are by 
nature too numerous to list.  We the People have kept the great resi-
duum of power for ourselves, ceding only what was necessary for gov-
ernment to carry out its limited functions.   
This residual sovereignty resides with each of us, giving us great 
liberty to act as we please, subject only to the limitation originally un-
derstood to be placed upon sovereigns: that we exercise our sove-
reignty so as not to harm others.  When viewed this way, the Ninth 
Amendment becomes understandable and meaningful.  It suggests 
that there is implicitly a harm principle that should guide judicial con-
struction of claims of unenumerated rights. 
How precisely to define harm is a question I spend a good deal of 
time on in my book and I will not repeat it here.47  Suffice it to say that 
there is a relatively rich literature from the founding era regarding the 
kinds of harms that were and normatively should be considered to be 
legally cognizable.  The larger point—for purposes of this article—is 
that an originalist understanding of the Ninth Amendment would re-
quire consultation and fidelity to the conception of sovereignty embo-
died in the Law of Nations in existence at the time the Ninth Amend-
ment was ratified.  This, in turn, provides one relatively small example 
of a situation in which acknowledging and incorporating international 
law principles should be considered essential to the task of interpret-
ing the U.S. Constitution. 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 235 (“The fear of the Ninth 
Amendment, even by committed textualists/originalists, results in part from its apparently open-
ended reference to unenumerated rights.”). 
 47 SEE LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 48-59. 
